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Maryam H

Student Seminar #12: Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices

DateTimePresenterLocation
Monday, October 14, 2019
(22 Mehr 1398)
12:30 – 13:30
Kourosh Khansary
Khatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“It is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. This paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices. It shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm’s stock. When this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases, and the beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens. The trader profits from this trading strategy, partly because his trading distorts the firm’s investment. We therefore refer to this strategy as manipulation. We show that trading without information is profitable only with sell orders, driving a wedge between the allocational implications of buyer and seller initiated speculation, and providing justification for restrictions on short sales. “

Required Reading(s)
Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices

 

Student Seminar #11: Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership

DateTimePresenterLocation
Monday, October 07, 2019
(15 Mehr 1398)
12:30 – 13:30Esmaeil AliabadiKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the U.S. airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities.1 Within‐route changes in common ownership concentration robustly correlate with route‐level changes in ticket prices, even when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large asset managers. We conclude that a hidden social cost—reduced product market competition—accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.”

Required Reading(s)
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership

 

Student Seminar #10: How Smart Is Smart Money?

DateTimePresenterLocation
Monday, September 30, 2019
(08 Mehr 1398)
12:30 – 13:30Ramtin SalamatKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“I find that companies funded by more experienced VCs are more likely to go public. This follows both from the direct influence of more experienced VCs and from sorting in the market, which leads experienced VCs to invest in better companies. Sorting creates an endogeneity problem, but a structural model based on a two‐sided matching model is able to exploit the characteristics of the other agents in the market to separately identify and estimate influence and sorting. Both effects are found to be significant, with sorting almost twice as important as influence for the difference in IPO rates.”

Required Reading(s)How Smart Is Smart Money? A Two‐Sided Matching Model of Venture Capital

 

Group Meeting #9: Margin Requirements, Speculative Trading, and Stock Price Fluctuations: The Case of Japan

DateTimePresenterLocation
Sunday, August 25, 2019
(03 Shahrivar 1398)
12:30 – 13:30Khatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“An increase in margin requirements in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is followed by a decline in margin borrowing, trading volume, the proportion of trading performed through margin accounts, the growth in stock prices, and the conditional volatility of daily returns. The nonmarginable Second Section stocks show a smaller change in volatility and only a delayed weak price response. The hypothesis that margin requirements restrict the behavior of destabilizing speculators can explain these correlations but cannot explain the observation that individuals, the most active users of margin funds, appear to be good market timers.”

Required Reading(s)Margin Requirements, Speculative Trading, and Stock Price Fluctuations: The Case of Japan

 

Selected Topics in Public Finance “Short Course”

Dr. Ali Shourideh

Assistant Professor of Economics at Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

Overview
  • How should governments design their tax policies optimally? What are the determinants of social insurance policies and welfare programs? In this class, we review the basic tools of public finance and optimal taxation with an emphasis on social insurance and redistribution. We apply these methods to study unemployment insurance, universal basic income, etc., both theoretically and quantitatively.
Biography
  • Ali Shourideh is an Assistant Professor of Economics and Frank A. and Helen E. Risch Faculty Development Professor of Business at Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business. He conducts research in the fields of macroeconomics, public finance, and contract theory. In his research, he has studied optimal taxation of various forms of income and expenditure in presence of international trade and specific knowledge about technology as well as determinants of sovereign debt and government pensions when governments have redistributional motives. He has also studied markets with adverse selection and the role of imperfect competition and learning in such markets. Professor Shourideh received his B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, Iran, and his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Minnesota. Previously, he has taught at New York University and Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

Selected Topics in Public Finance «Short Course»

Dr. Ali Shourideh

Assistant Professor of Economics at Tepper School of Business

Carnegie Mellon University

Overview
Biography

Registration Info

  • Registration fee:

    • Students, 100,000 Tomans
    • Others, 200,000 Tomans
  • This course will be presented in Farsi.

  • Deadline: 5th September, 2019

  • Limitted Scholarships are Available.

Student Seminar #9: Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency

DateTimePresenterLocation
Sunday, August 11, 2019
(20 Mordad 1398)
12:30 – 13:30Mohammadreza SalehiKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3‐to 12‐month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented.”

Required Reading(s)Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency

 

Student Seminar #8: The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015

DateTimePresenterLocation
Sunday, August 04, 2019
(13 Mordad 1398)
12:30 – 13:30Vahid RostamKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“What is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy? Is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and, if so, by how much? Is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long run? Which particular assets have the highest long-run returns? We answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive data set for all major asset classes, including housing. The annual data on total returns for equity, housing, bonds, and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, and our new evidence reveals many new findings and puzzles.”

Required Reading(s)The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870-2015

 

International Trade II Summer School 2019

iran is the largest economy in the world that is still outside the World Trade Organization. What are the gains and challenges of integrating to the world economy for the Iranian consumers and producers? How would labor markets and consequently political parties respond to international trade?

To answer these policy questions, it is imperative to understand the global economy and its institutions from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The objective of this summer school is to bring interested Iranian scholars up to speed with the advancements in International Trade Theory with an emphasis on “Tariff Wars” and “Political Polarization”. It will also briefly review models used and developed by modern trade economists to measure the effects of different policy schemes.

TARGET AUDIENCE

The intended audience of the summer school are researchers and graduate students with some research background in Economics, Finance and Public Policy or closely related fields.