Tehran Institute for Advanced Studies (TeIAS)

/ Designing and Pricing Evidence __ Nima Haghpanah


Designing and Pricing Evidence

January 13, 2020


Khatam University, Building No2.
Address: Mollasadra Blvd., North Shirazi St., East Daneshvar St., No.17. See location on Google map


Dr. Nima Haghpanah

Pennsylvania State University


We study how a profit-maximizing platform designs and prices certificates for workers who subsequently enter a competitive labor market. The platform designs a test, which generates a (possibly random) score based on each worker’s productivity, and sets a uniform fee that it charges each worker who wishes to disclose her score to firms. After observing the worker’s disclosure (if any), the labor market pays a wage that equals the worker’s expected productivity given all available information. We show that if the platform can select equilibria, it can extract all of the surplus by using two scores. In contrast, if the workers choose their most preferred equilibrium, then even with binary types the platform optimally uses a continuum of scores and higher scores appear exponentially more than the lower scores.


Nima Haghpanah is an assistant professor of Economics at Pennsylvania State University. Prior to that, he was a postdoctoral associate at MIT CSAIL and Sloan School of Management. He obtained his PhD in 2014 from Northwestern University. His dissertation was on optimal
multi-parameter auctions, and his research interests are mechanism design, auction design, and game theory. Nima has received a best dissertation award from Northwestern University, and a graduate fellowship from the Simons Foundation.