Dr. Maryam Saeedi
Assistant Professor of Economics at Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
The importance of reputation signals in markets where product quality is imperfectly observed has been long emphasized. In particular, this is a key consideration for the overall performance of trading platforms and online markets that are becoming increasingly important mechanisms for trade. We consider here reputation signals as imperfect aggregators of trade histories that are correlated with firm quality. This is the case, for example, of quality badges given by some trading platforms that partition sellers into a small number (in many cases two) of groups. This paper considers the impact of such reputation mechanisms on market outcomes (e.g. prices and market shares), the impact of information quality and the question of design of optimal partitions.
Maryam Saeedi is an assistant professor of economics at Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University. She was an Assistant Professor of Economics at The Ohio State University before joining CMU. Professor Saeedi conducts research in the fields of Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, and Game Theory. In her research, she focused on online platforms and eBay in particular. She studies various aspects of online markets, such as the value of reputation, the effects of implementing additional regulations on reputation, the effects of changes to the reputation mechanism, and dynamic eBay auctions. In other recent project, she studies the effect of an increase in price transparency in health care market, in particular, on patient choice, hospital prices, and possible facilitation of collusion among hospitals.
Professor Saeedi received a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, Iran, an M.A. in Economics from University of British Columbia in Vancouver, and Ph.D. in Economics from University of Minnesota.