Student Seminar #2: Do Director Elections Matter?

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Date	Time	Presenter	Location
Monday, February 04, 2019 (15 Bahman 1397)	12:30 – 13:30	Peyman Shahidi	Khatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001–2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections called Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is. A series of tests, including one that exploits variation in Years-to-election that comes from other boards, supports a causal interpretation. Further analyses show that other governance mechanisms do not drive the relation between board Years-to-election and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We conclude that director elections have important implications for corporate governance.”

Required Reading(s)

Do Director Elections Matter?

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