

# Testing Networked Systems: Theory and Practice

Mohammad Mousavi



A discipline of testing is:  
extremely important, and  
can be rigorous, too.

# Part 1:

## (Model-Based) Testing Fundamentals: Theory and Practice

# Based on joint work with:

- **Hamid Reza Asaadi** (U Tehran, now at Stony Brook U),
- Rachid Kherrazi (Philips Healthcare, now at Promedico),
- **Ramtin Khosravi** (U Tehran),
- Mehmet Kovacioglu (Philips Healthcare, now at Credit Suisse),
- **Neda Noroozi** (TU Eindhoven, now at Nspyre),
- Mahsa Varshosaz (Halmstad U),
- Vivek Vishal (Philips Healthcare, now at ASML), and
- Tim Willemse (TU Eindhoven).



# Testing:


Why? What? How?

# Why?

## Software at Your Heart

Software glitches in **pacemakers**

“Company said it has not received any reports of deaths or clinical complications resulting from the glitch, which appears in about **53** out of every **199,100 cases.**”



[Killed by Code, 2010]

# Why?

## Software at Critical Infrastructure

... a glitch caused more than **3,200 US prisoners** to be **released early**. The software calculates a prisoner's sentence depending on good/bad behaviour and was introduced in 2002.



Photo by Thomas Hawk @ Flickr

[BBC News 2015]

# Why?

## Software at Your Car

Over the past two years Nissan has been recalling airbags adding up to over **1 million cars** ... due to a glitch in the **airbag's sensory** detectors. There has been a reported **two accidents** due to this software failure.




Photo from Wikipedia

# Why?

## Software at Your Heart

At least **212 deaths** from device **failure** in **five different brands** of implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) according to a study reported to the FDA



[Killed by Code, 2010]

# Why?

## Bugs (Faults): Facts of Life

“Coders introduce bugs at the rate of 4.2 defects per hour of programming. If you crack the whip and force people to move more quickly, things get even worse.”



[Watts Humphreys]

# Why?

## Bugs (Faults): Facts of Life

“Cost of software faults in 2016: **1100 Billion USD**,

Number of people affected by software faults:  
**4.4 Billion people.**”


[Tricentis, Software Fail Watch, 2016]



Photo Copyright: Tricentis

# Why?

## Boehm's Curve





# What?

## Faults, Errors, Failures

- Fault: incorrect implementation:
  - commission: wrong implementation
  - omission: forgotten implementation (the more difficult one)
- Error: incorrect system state
- Failure (anomaly, incident) : visible error in the behavior




Photo from Wikipedia

# Example

Spec: inputs an integer, and outputs  $2*i^3$

Implementation:

```
#include <iostream>
```

```
#include <math.h>
```

```
int main() {  
    int i;  
    cin >> i;  
    i = 2 * i;  
    i = pow(i, 3);  
    cout << i;  
    return 0;  
}
```

# Example

1. `cin >> i;`
2. `i = 2 * i;`
3. `i = pow(i, 3);`
4. `cout << i;`

- Conceptual mistake: confusing the binding power of operators
- **Fault**: Statements 2 and 3 are in the wrong order
- **Error**: State of the program after line 3 may have the wrong value for `i`.
- **Failure**:
  - Test-case: input 1, expected output 2.
  - Actual execution: input 1 ... output 8!

# What? Testing

Planned **experiments** to:

1. reveal bugs (**turn faults into failures**, test to fail),  
“Testing can show the presence of bugs, but not their absence.” [Dijkstra]
2. gain confidence in **software quality** (test to pass)

# What?

## Testing: Validation and Verification

- **Validation:** Have we made the **right product**; compliance with the intended usage (often: **user-centered, manual** process, on the end product)
- **Verification:** Have we made the **product right**; **compliance** between artifacts of different phases (often: artifact-driven, **formalizable and mechanizable** process among all phases)


**Our Focus**

# How?

## Test-Case, Test-Suite

- **Test-Case:** a pair of
  - inputs (e.g., running environment, input values or pre-conditions, timing of events) and
  - expected outputs (e.g., concrete output values or symbolic properties input and output)
- **Test-Suite:** a set or list of test-cases

# Testing



# What?

## Levels of Testing

System


**System Testing**  
(Acceptance, User)  
Selenium, EyeAutomate  
GUI Model Testing,  
Automated GUI Testing

Subsystems

**Integration Testing**  
jUnit, Mockito  
Dependency Injection  
Mocking

Units

**Unit Testing**  
jUnit, QuickCheck,  
EvoSuite  
**Test-Driven Dev.**  
Equivalence Partitioning,  
Decision Tables,  
Classification Trees





# Example

## Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Step 1:

Fix the signature of the class

```
package example.stack;  
public class SimpleStack {  
    public boolean isEmpty();  
    public int pop();  
    public void push(int item)  
}
```

# Example

Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Write class invariants and a few properties for each method:

/\*

**Pre-Condition:** True (can be called in all states, with all inputs)

**Returns:**

- true on an empty initialized SimpleStack
- false on a SimpleStack on which more successful “push”es are performed than “pop”s

State remains unchanged in both cases \*/

# Example

## Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Step 3:

Start with a test:

@Test

```
public void testNewStackIsEmpty() {  
    SimpleStack stack = new SimpleStack();  
    Assert.assertTrue("New stack should be empty!",  
        true == stack.isEmpty());  
}
```

# Example

## Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Step 4:

Test and check if any test fails.

If so, write the minimal amount of code to pass the test(s):

```
public class SimpleStack {  
    public boolean isEmpty() {  
        return true;  
    }  
}
```

# Example

Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Step 5:

Refactor the code if needed.

Repeat steps 3 to 5 until the requirements are covered.

# Example

## Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Step 3:

Start with a test:

@Test

```
public void testNewStackPush() {  
    SimpleStack stack = new SimpleStack();  
    int item = 1;  
    stack.push(item);  
    Assert.assertFalse("Stack shouldn't be empty after a push!",  
        stack.isEmpty());  
}
```

# Example

Step 4:

Test and check if any test fails.

If so, write the minimal amount of code to pass the test(s):

```
public class SimpleStack {  
    boolean empty = true;  
    public void push(int item) {  
        empty = false;  
    }  
    public boolean isEmpty() {  
        return empty;  
    }  
}
```

# Example

Test-Driven Development of a SimpleStack Class (in Java)

Step 5:

Refactor the code if needed.

Repeat steps 3 to 5 until the requirements are covered.



# What We Do Not Cover: Test Management and Policy



# What We Do Not Cover: Alternatives to Testing

- **Model Checking:** test the state-space  
(all executions) for formally specified properties
  - + rigorous analysis, push-button technology
  - not (yet) scalable to very large systems  
(state-space explosion)

# What We Do Not Cover: Alternatives to Testing

- **Static Analysis:** test abstract properties **without running** the program, e.g., division by zero and empty/unspecified cases
  - + **automatic** and **scalable** for generic and abstract properties;
  - + existing powerful **tools**;
  - involves **approximation** (true negatives and false positives);
  - complicated (may involve **theorem proving**) for concrete and specific properties (proving the abstraction function to be “correct”)

# Theory:

## Introduction to Model-Based Testing


# Model-Based Testing

- **Abstractions** from reality
- Separating different **concerns**
- Approximating system behavior and / or its **environment**




# Model-Based Testing


- Modeling the desired behavior (system) / possible interactions (environment)




# Model-Based Testing



[Tretmans, 2008]












# Theory:



## Testing from Labeled Transition Systems



# Equivalence By Observation












# Completed Trace Equivalence


$$I \approx_{\text{ctr}} S$$

$$\text{traces}(I) = \text{traces}(S)$$

$$\text{c\_traces}(I) = \text{c\_traces}(S)$$







?  
 $\approx_{\text{ctr}}$







Moral of the story:  
 trace equivalence is **too coarse**  
 for **conformance** testing **open systems**

















*What we did  
using switches*



Environment



System

# Testing Equivalence



$$I \approx_{te} S$$

[De Nicola and Hennessy'84]  
[Brookes, Hoare, and Roscoe'84]  
[Darondeau'82][Kennaway'81]



*for every environment E:*



$$\text{traces}(E \parallel I) = \text{traces}(E \parallel S)$$



$$\text{c\_traces}(E \parallel I) = \text{c\_traces}(E \parallel S)$$







































*Now, we know that we have completed a trace.*

Env




*occurs if no other transition can*

S1




S2




$$c\_traces(Env \upharpoonright S_1) = \{ab, a\theta c\}$$

Env




$$c\_traces(Env \upharpoonright S_2) = \{ab\}$$

S1



S2



# Refusal Equivalence


$$I \approx_{\text{rf}} S \quad [\text{Philips}'87]$$

*for every environment E:*

$$\text{traces}(E \parallel I) = \text{traces}(E \parallel S)$$

$$\text{c\_traces}(E \parallel I) = \text{c\_traces}(E \parallel S)$$

# And there is more!




## The RvG Linear Time – Branching Time Spectrum


# Defining specifications at a higher-level



Impl. 1



Impl. 2



Specification

# Testing Pre-order


$$I \sqsubseteq_{te} S \quad [\text{De Nicola and Hennessy}'84]$$

*for every environment E:*


$$\text{traces}(E \parallel I) \subseteq \text{traces}(E \parallel S)$$

$$\text{c\_traces}(E \parallel I) \subseteq \text{c\_traces}(E \parallel S)$$


# Restriction to Specification




Feature #1  
Partial Specification



Feature #2  
Partial Specification



Feature #3  
Partial Specification





# Restriction to Specification

$$I \text{ conf } S \quad [\text{Brinksma87}]$$



*for every environment E:*

$$\text{traces}(E \parallel I) \cap \text{traces}(S) \subseteq \text{traces}(E \parallel S)$$

$$\text{c\_traces}(E \parallel I) \cap \text{traces}(S) \subseteq \text{c\_traces}(E \parallel S)$$

# I/O Transition Systems

Distinguishing between input and output actions



# Pre-orders on I/O transition systems

- The same notions apply here
  - I/O test pre-order
  - I/O refusal pre-order

$$\mathbf{I} \sqsubseteq_{\text{ior}} \mathbf{S}$$

*for every environment E:*

$$\text{traces}(E \parallel \mathbf{I}) \subseteq \text{traces}(E \parallel \mathbf{S})$$


$$\text{c\_traces}(E \parallel \mathbf{I}) \subseteq \text{c\_traces}(E \parallel \mathbf{S})$$

# I/O Conformance


Informally,

I/O Conformance = I/O Refusal restricted to  
specification traces




**I ioco S** [Tretmans'95]





# Black-box testing for ioco




# Example



# ioco Test Cases

- I/O transition systems
- The only terminal states:  and 
- Reversed I/O actions
- Special action  $\theta$
- Finite and deterministic



# Automatic Test Case Generation


- Init:
  - Generate an initial state
- Recursion:
  - At each point in the recursion choose non-deterministically between:
    1. Stopping the recursion
    2. Supplying an input
    3. Observing an output (one transition per output action)



# Practice:

## EFT and X-Ray Machine Cases


# Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT)




# The System Under Test


- An Operational EFT Switch, developed at Fanap
- Java Application (~100 KLOC)
- Extensive use of Java frameworks


- *Already tested, but not with a disciplined view on concurrency*




# Complex Architectures








# Example Scenarios



# Example Scenarios






# ISO 8583 Standard

## *Message Flows*


### 5.2.4 Reversal transactions



1420/1421 reversal advice/reversal advice repeat  
1430 reversal advice response

# ISO 8583 Standard

## *Transaction Flows*



T  
I  
M  
E  
↓  
v

# ISO 8583 Standard

## *Business Rules*

b) The amount, transaction data element in a reversal advice or notification shall contain the amount to be reversed and shall be less than or equal to the original amount as shown in table 3.

c) Whenever the acquirer times out waiting for a response to an authorization or financial transaction request or advice, a reversal advice or notification of the transaction shall be sent (see 5.2.12).

# Concurrent Transactions



POS #1

Purchase Transaction #1

Reversal Transaction #2



POS #2

Purchase Transaction #2

# Our Method


- Using **Model-Based Testing**
- Using a set of integrated tools
  - **Generating** and running **test cases**
  - **Logging** and prioritizing test cases
  - Measuring test **coverage**
  - Testing **business rules**

# Back to the real world!



# Switch Specification

- Modeling in UPPAAL
- $\approx 25$  automata



Switch behavior in purchase scenario

# Specification Structure


## Purchase Use Case




*Four uses cases till now*



# Testing Ecosystem (anno 2008)



# Testing Ecosystem (anno 2018)



# Measuring Coverage

Using Cobertura code coverage tool  
(now use Eclemma)


The screenshot displays the Cobertura code coverage tool interface. On the left, a code editor shows the source code for the 'nanoswitch' package, specifically the 'SecurityFunction' and 'SecurityParameter' classes. The code is annotated with line numbers and coverage status (covered/uncovered). On the right, a 'Coverage Report - All Packages' table is visible, showing the following data:

Package	# Classes	Line Coverage	Branch Coverage	Complexity
nanoswitch_cleaning_jobs_clean	2	100%	N/A	0
nanoswitch_security	1	100%	N/A	1
nanoswitch_config	2	80%	62%	1
nanoswitch_base_components_handlers	1	76%	N/A	1.4
nanoswitch_base_components	2	75%	N/A	1
nanoswitch_network	4	74%	49%	3.244
nanoswitch_protocols_encoding_mml	2	73%	60%	1
nanoswitch_info	3	70%	54%	1.526
nanoswitch_message	4	68%	46%	1.366
nanoswitch_network_channel_base	5	67%	54%	1.925
nanoswitch_protocols_handlers	5	67%	41%	8.364
nanoswitch_eth_ah1	1	66%	50%	2
nanoswitch_protocols_ipv_enums	11	61%	20%	1.981
nanoswitch_network_channel_endpoint	1	59%	50%	4.444
nanoswitch_application	4	59%	37%	3.1
nanoswitch_info_access	3	58%	26%	2.818
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7_encoding	2	58%	25%	2
nanoswitch_routing_components	2	58%	45%	3.692
nanoswitch_excitation_mml	1	57%	N/A	1
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7_encoding	1	53%	0%	0
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7_encoding	1	53%	0%	0
nanoswitch_protocols_base	10	51%	25%	1.273
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7	10	50%	32%	8.029
nanoswitch_scheduler_base	2	50%	23%	9.2
nanoswitch_persistence	10	45%	61%	1.333
nanoswitch_util_encoder	5	45%	33%	2.208
nanoswitch_cleaning_cycles_criteria	3	44%	0%	2.909
nanoswitch_scheduler_base	6	41%	30%	1.094
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7_encoding	2	41%	0%	0
nanoswitch_job	10	40%	4%	1.372
nanoswitch_message_components	2	40%	27%	12.273
nanoswitch_cleaning_cycles_criteria	5	38%	28%	2.375
nanoswitch_util	16	38%	18%	1.502
nanoswitch_cleaning_settlement	7	37%	16%	3.098
nanoswitch_persistence_mml	6	36%	38%	1.849
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7_encoding	20	35%	22%	1.873
nanoswitch_job_queue	2	35%	45%	2.552
nanoswitch_security_security_key	4	34%	37%	1.152
nanoswitch_authentication_component	2	34%	22%	8.562
nanoswitch_transport	12	34%	20%	2.955
nanoswitch_protocols_sip7	8	33%	22%	7.5
nanoswitch_scheduler	10	31%	13%	1.901


*What about model-based coverage?*

# Logging Offline Test Suite


- The adaptor logs the messages from TRON
- Prioritization based on coverage
- Used for regression testing



# Testing Ecosystem



# Testing Business Rules



# Results

- Have found a number of **bugs** in the operational system
  - One traced back to **null-pointer** dereferencing
  - Poor **exception** handling
- Code **coverage** of about 40%



# Observations

- Modeling language and tool limitations
  - **Component** (de-compositional) testing
  - **Asynchrony**
  - **Data** specification and selection
  - **Variability**
- **Scalability** Issues
  - Running **concurrent** MBT instances
  - Reducing **buffer lengths**, pool sizes, etc.






# Further Reading

- Asaadi, Khosravi, MRM, and Noroozi. **Towards Model-Based Testing of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems**. Proc. of FSEN 2011.  
Models publicly available on Assembla.
- Vishal, Kovacioglu, Kherazi, and MRM. **Integrating Model-Based and Constraint-Based Testing Using SpecExplorer**. Proc. of MoTiP 2012.


# Back to Theory:

## Component Testing

# Decompositional Testing





# Decompositional Testing



for all  $c$ ,  $(c \parallel e) \text{ ioco } S$  iff  $c \text{ ioco } S/e$

# Compositional Testing with ioco

[M. van der Bijl, A. Rensink & J. Tretmans -2003]



# Decompositional properties

## 1. Decomposability

$$\exists \vec{s}', \forall \bar{c}, \bar{e}. \quad \bar{c} \textbf{ioco} \vec{s}' \quad \Rightarrow \quad \bar{c} \parallel \bar{e} \textbf{ioco} \vec{s}$$

## 2. Strong decomposability

$$\exists \vec{s}', \forall \bar{c}, \bar{e}. \quad \bar{c} \textbf{ioco} \vec{s}' \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \bar{c} \parallel \bar{e} \textbf{ioco} \vec{s}$$

# Decompositional Testing

for all  $c$ ,  $(c \parallel e) \text{ ioco } s \iff c \text{ ioco } S/e$

Construction of  $S/e$ :

- Check:  
Can  $S$  be the **composition of  $e$**  with some  $c$ ?
- **Filter out** the behavior of  **$e$**  in  $S$

# Further Reading


Noroozi, MRM, and Willemse. Decomposability in Input Output Conformance Testing. Proc. of MBT 2013.




# Back to Theory:

*Asynchrony*


# Asynchronous Communication




# Synchronous Communication




# Synchronous Communication



# Asynchronous Communication




# Prior Art [Tretmans&Verhaard'92]




# State of the Art

[Petrenko&Yevtushenko'02,03][Simao&Petrenko'10]




# State of the Art [Weiglhofer&Wotawa'09]





# What we are after




# Delayed Traces

Trace:

money?

refund!

button?




# Delayed Traces

Trace:

money?

button?


refund!



# Delayed right-closed IOTS

**Delay right-closed IOTS**,  $\mathcal{S}$  is an IOTS such that

$\forall \sigma \in \text{Straces}(\mathcal{S})$  then delayed trace of  $\sigma \in \text{Straces}(\mathcal{S})$



$\sigma.x.a \in \text{Straces}(\mathcal{S})$  then  $\sigma.a.x \in \text{Straces}(\mathcal{S})$

# Theorems

## Theorem

If implementation **i** is delay right-closed, then  
**i ioco Spec** if and only if **Q(i) ioco Spec**

## Theorem

If  $\forall t \in \text{TestCases}(\textcolor{green}{S})$ , **i** passes **t** if and only if **Q(i)** passes **t**  
then  
implementation **i** is delay right-closed IOTS

# Further Reading

Noroozi, Khosravi, MRM, and Willemse.  
Synchrony and Asynchrony in Conformance  
Testing. SoSym J., 2015.



# Thank You Very Much!

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