

## Microeconomics II (Spring 2018)

Behrang Kamali

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### Description

This is an advanced course on game theory, broadly defined.

### Course Material

You can use the following text books:

George Mailath, Modelling Strategic Behavior, 2018, World Scientific Press. (available at [his website](#).)

Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R., 1995. Microeconomic theory (Vol. 1). New York: Oxford university press.

Gibbons, R., 1992. Game theory for applied economists. Princeton University Press.

Jehle, G. A., and P. J. Reny (2011): Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Pearson Education, third edition.

Osborne, M.J. and Rubinstein, A., 1994. A course in game theory. MIT press.

**Slides, exams, solutions and other material is *not* for distribution to those outside of the current class.**

### Grading

The final grade will depend on

- 6 problem sets (%20),
- midterm exam on 1397/01/27 (%30),
- final exam on 1397/03/09 (%50).

You must type the problem sets' solutions. The final exam will not replace or change the weight of midterm exam under any circumstance. The final exam is cumulative.

### Instructor:

Behrang Kamali, email: [kamali.behrang@gmail.com](mailto:kamali.behrang@gmail.com).  
Office Hours: Saturday and Monday 2-3 pm, or by appointment.

**Teaching Assistant:**

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Office Hours: Monday 10-12 am, Wednesday 2-4 pm.  
Recitation: Wednesday 10-12 am.

# Tentative Course Outline

## 1. **Strategic Environments:**

Normal Form Games and Extensive Form Games

## 2. **Games of Complete Information:**

Nash Equilibrium, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection

## 3. **Games of Incomplete Information**

## 4. **Dynamic Games**

## 5. **Signaling**

## 6. **Moral Hazard**

## 7. **Bargaining**

(Time Permitting)

## 8. **Mechanism Design**

(Time Permitting)