Microeconomics II (Spring 2021)
Behrang Kamali

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Description

This is an advanced course on game theory, broadly defined.

Course Material

You can use the following text books:
George Mailath, Modelling Strategic Behavior, 2018, World Scientific Press. (available at his website.)
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R., 1995. Microeconomic theory (Vol. 1). New York: Oxford university press.
Gibbons, R., 1992. Game theory for applied economists. Princeton University Press.
Jehle, G. A., and P. J. Reny (2011): Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Pearson Education, third edition.
Osborne, M.J. and Rubinstein, A., 1994. A course in game theory. MIT press.

Slides, exams, solutions and other material is *not* for distribution to those outside of the current class.

Grading

The final grade will depend on

- 6 problem sets, 4 extra problem sets (%0),
- first midterm exam on 1399/12/23 (%20),
- second midterm exam on 1400/02/13 (%30),
- final exam on 1400/04/19 (%50).

I strongly suggest that you type the problem sets' solutions, otherwise we will not grade them. You do not need to submit the extra problem sets. The final exam will not replace or change the weight of other exams under any circumstance. The final exam is cumulative.

Instructor:

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Teaching Assistants:

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Recitation:
Group 1: Tuesday 16-18 by Morteza Honarvar.
Group 2: Wednsday 9-11 by Kourosh Khounsari.

Tentative Course Outline

1. **Strategic Environments:**

   Normal Form Games and Extensive Form Games

2. **Games of Complete Information:**

   Nash Equilibrium, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection

3. **Games of Incomplete Information**

4. **Dynamic Games**

5. **Signaling**

6. **Moral Hazard**

7. **Bargaining**

   (Time Permitting)

8. **Mechanism Design**

   (Time Permitting)