Student Seminar #4: Improving the Design of Conditional Transfer Programs

Monday, February 25, 2019

(06 Esfand 1397)

12:30 – 13:30Mohammad MajidiKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“Using a student level randomization, we compare three education-based conditional cash transfers designs: a standard design, a design where part of the monthly transfers are postponed until children have to re-enroll in school, and a design that lowers the reward for attendance but incentivizes graduation and tertiary enrollment. The two nonstandard designs significantly increase enrollment rates at both the secondary and tertiary levels while delivering the same attendance gains as the standard design. Postponing some of the attendance transfers to the time of re-enrollment appears particularly effective for the most at-risk children.”

Required Reading(s)Improving the Design of Conditional Transfer Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Education Experiment in Colombia

Student Seminar #3: Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

Monday, February 18, 2019

(29 Bahman 1397)

12:30 – 13:30Amirreza Ahmadzadeh
Pedram Pooyafar
Khatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve complementarity in types not only of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also in the degree of transferability between partners. We apply our conditions to study some models of risk sharing and incentive problems.”

Required Reading(s)Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

Student Seminar #2: Do Director Elections Matter?

Monday, February 04, 2019

(15 Bahman 1397)

12:30 – 13:30Peyman ShahidiKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001–2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections called Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is. A series of tests, including one that exploits variation in Years-to-election that comes from other boards, supports a causal interpretation. Further analyses show that other governance mechanisms do not drive the relation between board Years-to-election and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We conclude that director elections have important implications for corporate governance.”

Required Reading(s)Do Director Elections Matter?

Student Seminar #1: Does Shareholder Composition Matter?

Monday, January 28, 2019

(08 Bahman 1397)

12:30 – 14:00M. M. ShahrabiKhatam University (@ 17 Daneshvar), 7th Floor, Seminar Room

“We examine whether institutional ownership composition is related to parameters of the market reaction to negative earnings announcements. When firms report earnings below analysts’ expectations, the stock price response is more negative for firms with higher levels of ownership by momentum or aggressive growth investors. There is no evidence, however, that these institutions cause an “overreaction” to earnings news. Ownership structure is also related to trading volume and to stock price volatility on days around earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the composition of institutional shareholders effects stock price behavior around the release of corporate information.”

Required Reading(s)Does Shareholder Composition Matter? Evidence from the Market Reaction to Corporate Earnings Announcements