Tehran Institute for Advanced Studies (TEIAS)

/ Assignment, Matching, and School Choice __ Emre Doğan

Short Course

Assignment, Matching, and School Choice

Emre Doğan Poster

May 17-25, 2023
(27 Ordibehesht - 4 Khordad, 1402)

10:00 AM


Khatam University

Registration Deadline

May 13, 2023

You may need a VPN to start the talk.




May 17, 2023

15:00 – 18:00

May 18, 2023

14:00 – 17:00

May 24, 2023

15:00 – 18:00

May 25, 2023

14:00 – 17:00

Emre Doğan

Assistant Professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia


Many types of allocation and exchange of discrete resources are conducted by a central clearinghouse via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. Examples include the assignment of doctors to hospitals, the assignment of students to public schools, college admission, kidney exchange, etc. All these real-life problems are particular cases of assignment and matching problems. In this course, we will work on assignment and matching problems without transfers with a focus on axiomatic mechanism design. We will define several mechanisms as well as criteria that determine how “good” a mechanism is, such as efficiency, incentive compatibility, stability and fairness in many different settings including the housing market, house allocation problem, random assignment problem, and two-sided matching model. We also introduce the school choice problem, discuss the issues that policy makers face and recent works that address these issues.


Emre Dogan

Emre Doğan received his Ph.D. from Rice University in Houston, Texas in 2014. He started working at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia as a post-doctoral research fellow. He has been an assistant professor at the Higher School of Economics since 2016. His research interests include social choice theory, cooperative game theory, and matching and assignment.