Menu
7th Floor Seminar Room, Daneshvar Building, .
This event will also be live-streamed. Link will be provided to registrants.
September 6, 2024
Ali Kamranzadeh
Assistant Professor of Economics, Koç University
Overview
A mediator proposes a settlement between two contestants to avoid a conflict where the cost each contestant bears is inversely related to the contestant’s privately known strength. Their strength levels are identically distributed, and their welfares weigh equally in the mediator’s objective. However, the optimal proposal o ers one contestant much more than it does the other so that the former accepts it always, whereas the latter only occasionally. This unequal treatment improves the prospect of peace by making one contestant willing to settle without fearing that the action signals his weakness that his opponent can exploit should conflict occur.
Biography
Ali Kamranzadeh is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Koç University. He is an economics theorist with a particular interest in mechanism design and its applications in various institutional design problems such as con ict mediation and procurement auctions. His work is particularly concerned with the strategic implications of private information in con ict settings and explores mechanisms that can minimize the probability of con ict through carefully designed proposals. At Koç University, he continues to explore these themes, contributing to the broader discourse on economic theory and its applications to real-world political and economic con icts. Ali earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Western Ontario in 2022.
Please note that the site is under maintenance. Therefore, some parts of it may not work properly.
During this time, you can connect with us on social media.