The New Science of Market Design
In this workshop, we will discuss foundations and applications of of auction and matching market. We will first cover two theoretical pillars of modern market design: the theory of stable matching and the Vickery-Clark- Grove mechanism.
We will discuss how these two theories inspired various real-world marketplace designs, from the allocation of doctors to hospitals, to real-world auctions. We then cover three cutting edge research on designing computationally challenging marketplaces: First, we will see how auctions are used in online advertising marketplaces.
Then we will go through the problem of dynamic matching on stochastic networks, with applications in ride-sharing and kidney exchange. Finally, we will analyze the latest US spectrum auction – the most complex auction in human history – from a theoretical and practical perspective. Real-world and computational challenges of all applications will be discussed.
Date: Sep 4th 2016
DR. MOHAMMAD MOROVATI
He is an applied theorist whose research is focused on designing market institutions. He studies dynamic markets and networked markets—or combinations thereof—with applications in over-the-counter financial markets, kidney exchange pools, and online matching platforms. When resource allocation problems are computationally complex, as they often are in networked settings,
Ali Shourideh is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
Paul Milgrom is the Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and Sciences in the department of economics and professor by courtesy at the Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and director of the Market Design program at SIEPR.